Abstract-We propose a new approach to the interactive verification of synchronous systems. Our approach is based on two system representations: Systems to be verified are given as synchronous programs that are considered for the selection of proof rules, while the proof rules are applied on equivalent sets of synchronous guarded actions that are obtained by an automatic translation from the programs. Since the obtained guarded actions contain assumptions and assertions, they are directly used as proof goals in our approach. Due to a backannotation via control flow locations, there is still a direct correspondence between the two system representations. This way, the user can still consider the more readable program code while the implementation of the proof system on top of the guarded actions allows much more flexible decompositions of the verification goals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Model checking, either explicit or symbolic, bounded or unbounded, BDD-or SAT-based is without doubt one of the success stories of modern computer science [20] . Due to the exhaustive state space traversal, model checking suffers from the well-known state-space explosion problem. For this reason, many sophisticated improvements have been developed for model checking like predicate abstraction, partial order reduction, symmetry reduction and many other techniques. However, even with these improvements, it is not possible to automatically verify large systems.
A alternative approach to verification [21, 26] is based on interactive theorem provers like the HOL system [17] , Isabelle [33] , PVS [32] , ACL2 [25] and many others. These systems are general theorem provers for an undecidable predicate logic and require therefore a large amount of interaction that makes the verification of large designs typically too expensive. It is therefore necessary to increase the amount of automation by specializing the theorem provers to the specific problem. Although there was some early progress for register-transfer level hardware circuits, e.g. [27] and general reactive systems as e.g. the STeP prover [8] or Event-B [1] , there was little progress on more automation for hardware descriptions at higher abstraction levels [18] .
In general, appropriate proof rules for interactive reasoning about descriptions at high abstraction levels are required that allow one to decompose a proof goal into sub-goals until these are simple enough to be checked by automated decision procedures like model checking [38] . It is however not at all obvious which set of rules should be used for this purpose, and we therefore propose an open, evolvable, and programmable set of rules. Moreover, the level of abstraction of hardware designs has been raised from the registertransfer level to the algorithmic/system level. For this reason, hardware descriptions are now more related to concurrent software, but additionally deal with some notion of time. It is therefore natural to consider approaches to the verification of (concurrent) software which has already been suggested by Darringer in 1979 [11] .
It is well-known that axiomatic semantics as given by the Hoare calculus [4, 19, 22 ] is a basic foundation for the formal verification of software. This calculus provides proof rules for each kind of statement to reflect its semantics. Concerning interactive verification, these rules allow one to reduce a proof goal of that statement by generating corresponding proof goals for its sub-statements. This way, the program statements are finally eliminated and so-called verification conditions are left to be proved. Since the decomposition is mainly driven by the program's syntax, it can be automated up to a few rules that require additional information like invariants to deal with loops.
However, adapting Hoare calculi to system description languages like VHDL, Verilog, SystemVerilog, SystemC [9, 18] or to synchronous languages like Esterel and Quartz as done in [16] is not straightforward due to the different models of computation used by these languages (compared to sequential or multi-threaded software). One particular problem is thereby that due to the large amount of concurrency, several parts of the program are active at the same point of time. In contrast to sequential programs, a decomposition in the Hoare-logic style that is in some sense a symbolic execution from one control flow location to another one requires here the consideration of several flows. Extending Hoare calculi to concurrent software has already been considered by Owicki and Gries [30, 31] , but the model of computation used there is based on interleaving and is therefore not applicable to synchronous systems (see [16] for a more detailed discussion on the use of Hoare calculi for the verification of synchronous programs).
In this paper, we therefore propose a new approach to the interactive verification of synchronous systems (see Figure 1 ) that has been implemented as a prototype on Figure 1 . Idea of our Approach top of our Averest 1 system: We assume that the system is given as a synchronous Quartz program [36] . We then use available compilers of our Averest system to translate the program to an intermediate representation called AIF (Averest Intermediate Format) which is essentially a set of synchronous guarded actions. Since the obtained set of guarded actions contains not only assignments, but also assumptions and assertions, the guarded actions are not only used as system description, but also as proof goals. The user considers then the original source code and the assertions of the current proof goal to select a suitable proof rule. As our Averest system has been implemented in Microsoft's new F# language, it was natural to implement these rules also as F# functions so that these can be applied either in an interactive F# session or in a proof script, i.e. a F# script. By the rule application, the set of guarded actions (an AIF file) is decomposed into smaller AIF files where -in analogy to the Hoare calculus -the assignments are eliminated and only assumptions and assertions are left.
The use of the two system representations (program source code and guarded actions) has many advantages:
• Difficult problems like schizophrenic statements [7, 37] are already solved by the compilation to guarded actions and need no longer be dealt with in proof rules (which is a great advantage compared to SOS rules [36] that have to deal with these issues).
• Due to a back-annotation via the control-flow locations, there is a strong correspondence between the guarded actions and the source code. Thus, the user can identify the relevant program parts for a proof goal by considering the source code.
• Using guarded actions instead of the original source code allows more flexible decompositions of proof goals. In particular, there is no need to follow the syntax of the program.
• The compilation to guarded actions itself has been verified [34, 35, 37] and is therefore no potential loss of correctness.
• Available data structures and libraries of our Averest system can be shared between compilation and verification, e.g., to optimize the code generation.
• Compared to the rich syntax at the statement level, guarded actions have a simple syntax and therefore lead to simple and only a small number of rules.
• Since guarded actions may also be considered as conditional rewrite rules, the use of term rewriting is naturally integrated in our rules. Thus, efficient theorem proving procedures are much easier to implement for guarded actions than for parallel program statements.
We therefore use the source code for selecting the proof rules, but apply the rules to the corresponding set of guarded actions. The outline of the paper is as follows: We discuss some basics on synchronous languages in Section II and our proof rules in Section III. Section IV illustrates our approach by means of some preliminary case studies. A discussion of related work is given in Section V before we summarize our results.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Synchronous Programs
Synchronous programming languages [6] have been developed to describe reactive systems. The computation of a synchronous program is partitioned into macro steps that correspond to interactions between the reactive system and its environment. In each macro step, the reactive system reads new inputs and computes new outputs for the current state as well as a new internal state for the next macro step. Each macro step consists of a finite number of micro steps that are atomic actions like assignments, assumptions or assertions. The definition of macro steps depends on the particular language. In imperative languages like Esterel and Quartz, there is typically a statement called pause that separates one macro step from the next one. The control flow may rest at some of these pause statements to resume the execution of the micro steps from these locations in the next macro step. The synchronous model of computation further demands that all of these threads run in lock-step, i.e., the different computations between two concurrently active pause statements are all viewed to require the same amount of a logical unit-delay time. The execution of micro steps within a macro step must be ordered by their datadependencies since it is required that all variables have a unique value per macro step. Thus, the unique assignment to a variable must be done before the variable is read, and to this end, there must not be causality/dependency cycles at runtime.
B. Compilation to Synchronous Guarded Actions
Synchronous languages can be compiled to synchronous guarded actions that are often used as an intermediate representation in compilers [36] as well as simple system descriptions for verification and other analyses. Synchronous guarded actions are very simple: In general, a guarded action γ ⇒ α consists of a condition γ and an atomic action α which is in our case either an immediate assignment x = τ , a delayed assignment next(x) = τ , an assumption assume(ϕ) or an assertion assert(ϕ). The synchronous model of computation then demands that in each macro step, all enabled guarded actions have to be executed and that their execution does not invalidate once enabled guards (so that causality will be respected).
Our Averest system contains a compiler that computes for a given synchronous Quartz program an equivalent set of synchronous guarded actions. Since the pause statements (which are the essential control flow locations) have names that occur in the guarded actions as boolean variables, there is a strong correspondence between the guarded actions and the original source code. Specification s0 asserts that either a or b must hold, when o is emitted, and specification s1 essentially says the same from a global point of view. Property s2 asserts that o cannot hold at two successive points of time.
The ABRO module is compiled to the guarded actions shown in Figure 3 which are separated into control flow, data flow and assertions. Control flow actions are the assignments to control flow locations, while the data flow consists of the assignments to local and output variables. Note that a new control flow location w0 has been automatically added which is often called the boot location. s1 : 
C. Decomposition of Synchronous Guarded Actions
Assume a given Quartz program S has been compiled to an equivalent set of guarded actions G with control flow locations L. We consider the pair (G, L) as a proof goal. For the definition of our proof rules, we make the following definitions:
holds if the control flow is currently at a location inside L (G is not relevant).
• inNxt (G, L) is the disjunction of the guards γ of the control flow actions 3 γ ⇒ next( ) = true of G with ∈ L. Thus, inNxt (G, L) holds if the control flow enters next some of the locations in L. Based on these two definitions, there are four natural moves of the control flow:
holds if the program cannot enter a location of L from outside, thus its execution is instantaneous, i.e., it does not take time. enter (G, L) holds if the control flow is currently outside G, but will enter it next. term (G, L) holds if the control flow is currently inside G, but will leave it next. Finally, move (G, L) holds if the control flow makes an internal move inside G.
An important decomposition technique for synchronous systems is the decomposition into surface and depth which is formalized on the basis of guarded actions as follows: Definition 2.2 (Surface and Depth): Given a proof goal (G, L), we define its surface srfc(G, L) and depth dpth(G, L) as follows, where sat(ϕ) means that ϕ is satisfiable:
Checking the satisfiability of program expressions is undecidable so that we have to approximate the above sets by means of heuristics. In case of srfc(G, L), this is not difficult since ¬inNow (G, L) can only be satisfied when all ∈ L are made false. Thus, we can simply replace each occurrence of a label ∈ L in each guard γ with false and propagate the boolean constants. If the resulting formula is false, the action is not in the surface, otherwise we keep it (as conservative approximation) in the surface (even though the remaining guard may not be satisfiable). In a similar way, we can also approximate the depth by checking whether a guard can be satisfied when one of the locations in L holds: Typical guards are of the form ∧ ϕ ∨ ψ where neither ϕ nor ψ contain , so that these formulas have a satisfying assignment only if there is a satisfying assignment where holds. The conditions ϕ,ψ that stem from control flow conditions of the program are typically satisfiable.
For example, replacing all occurrences of wa, wb, wr in the guarded actions of ABRO by false yields: Thus, the surface consists of the first two control flow actions while the depth consists of all guarded actions. Splitting proof goals into their surfaces and depths is a very important decomposition that is also a key in the compilation of synchronous programs [36] .
III. PROOF RULES FOR SYNCHRONOUS GUARDED ACTIONS
A. Enumerating Control Flow States
A simple, but nevertheless effective strategy for decomposition is to enumerate the control flow states and to prove the assertions of a macro step locally in the generated states. This yields essentially an extended finite state machine (EFSM) that can alternatively be directly generated by the Averest compiler in that surfaces and depths are repeatedly computed. Checking a safety property can then often be done by checking the property locally in each state taking into account the assumptions and immediate assignments made in that state. In more difficult cases, a stronger property may have to be checked this way that implies the given safety property. Strengthening the proof goal is a typical step that requires user interaction. In case of our ABRO example, Figure 4 shows its corresponding EFSM with five control flow states that are defined by assignments of the control flow locations w0,wa,wb, and wr. In each state, we list the data flow actions that can be activated in that state, and the transitions between the states are labeled by boolean conditions that have to hold for enabling the transition.
For example, to prove specification s0 or s1, we just have to consider the guards of the actions that emit o: As can be seen in Figure 3 , there is only a single action emitting o, and its guard obviously requires that either a or b holds.
Checking property s2 is more difficult: Considering the EFSM, one can see that the guards that enable the emission of o in states 1,3 and 4 are exactly the conditions that lead to a transition to state 2. Hence, if there is an emission of o, the next state will be state 2, and in that state it is impossible to emit o again (since state 2 has no data flow action at all).
Enumerating the reachable control flow states is often practically feasible, although this procedure is exponential in the number of control flow locations in the worst case, and thus exponential in the size of the synchronous program. In many cases, a complete enumeration is not necessary, and our proof rules allow us to make much shorter proofs. Many additional techniques can be used as well, and we are planning to enlarge our set of proof rules over time, incorporating e.g. techniques based on program slicing as discussed in [3] .
For example, one can alternatively argue that the guard of the control flow location wr is implied by the guard of o which can be easily proved by a propositional logic checker.
B. Local Provability
In the following, we assume the existence of a procedure 4 check(ϕ) that will yield one of the following results for a given boolean program expression ϕ: check(ϕ) :=    1 : if ϕ was proved to be valid 0 : if ϕ was proved to be invalid ⊥ : otherwise Note that the formulas ϕ given to the mentioned procedure check(ϕ) are quantifier-free boolean program expressions. It is clear that the use of SMT solvers is recommended.
The overall task of the following proof rules listed in the next subsection is to decompose a proof goal (G, L) into subgoals (G 1 , L 1 ) , . . . , (G p , L p ) until these can be automatically proved. Note that the set of labels L i of a sub-goal (G i , L i ) identifies the part of the program S that is currently considered in the subgoal. This is often a useful hint for the selection of the right proof rules.
Proving a safety property locally means checking it in each of the reachable control flow states of the EFSM. In order to make a local proof, we have to collect the assumptions and assertions of a particular state:
Definition 3.1 (Collecting Assumptions and Assertions): Given a proof goal (G, L), we define
is the conjunction of all assumptions in G having the trivial guard true.
• asm * (G, L) is defined as the fixpoint of the following iteration:
where cond(α) is defined as follows:
} captures all proof obligations. The set asm(G, L) is used to collect all assumptions that hold at starting time, since their guards are (syntactically) true. The formula asm * (S) is more general in that also the transitive closure and the immediate assignments are collected in that condition. The task of our proof rules is to achieve that the assertions given in the program become locally provable in the following sense: Definition 3.2 (Local Provability): A proof goal (G, L) is locally provable if the following holds:
4 Note that the satisfiability of program expressions is undecidable, so that the result ⊥ of check(ϕ) is unavoidable.
A typical assertion given in a program will usually not be locally provable since it depends not only on the assumptions and immediate assignments of a particular state, but also on invariants that are established by the entire execution of the program. For this reason, the proof rules have the important task to add further assumptions and assertions in each decomposition step so that the finally obtained proof goals (G i , L i ) become locally provable.
C. Proof Rules
Our decomposition rules for a synchronous system (G, L) are given in Figures 5 and 6 . These rules are implemented as functions in F# (in which our entire Averest system has been implemented). The rules are to be read as follows: below the line, expressions like (G, L) f (. . .) denote that proof goal (G, L) is decomposed into the subgoals listed above the line by applying the F# function f with listed arguments to (G, L). Moreover, calls to check(ϕ) are listed above the line that have to hold for a successful rule application (otherwise, the F# function fails).
In addition to the already defined control flow predicates, surfaces and depths, we also assume function prop(ϕ) for constant propagation. Finally, [ϕ] τ x denotes that all occurrences of x in ϕ are replaced by τ .
Here are some explanations of the rules:
• Solver checks whether the current subgoal is locally provable according to Definition 3.2.
• Simplification eliminates all guarded actions with unsatisfiable guards.
• Branching makes a case distinction (for a conditional statement) with the given condition σ. Special cases of this rule without splitting the set of locations are the CaseDistinction rule, which allows a boolean case distinction and the MultipleCases rules, which allows a general case distinction. Note that it is important that σ only holds at starting time, i.e., in the surface.
• HypothesisIntroduction introduces a new hypothesis by checking the validity of the given formula and adding it afterwards to the set of guarded actions as an assumption.
• Once an assertion has been proved, it can be used as assumption by the ProveAssertion rule.
• The Invariant rule is similar to the invariant rule of the Hoare calculus. It is thereby assumed that the proof goal (G, L) contains a loop with invariant γ and termination condition χ. Thus, we check that γ holds initially, and that γ also holds after each termination of the considered loop body. We may assume γ whenever the loop is iterated.
• The SequenceSplit rule splits the current goal into two subgoals such that the considered subsystems are executed in a sequence, i.e., the second one starts as soon as the first one terminates. The given condition δ
Prove(assertID) is proved after the first part of the sequence terminates, and can be used as an assumption for the second part.
• The Slicing rule allows one to split the goal into two independent goals by slicing out the guarded actions that are enabled by control flow locations contained in the argument set L 1 .
• The ConeOfInfluence rule removes all guarded actions that do not influence the assertions (FV(ϕ) denotes thereby the set of free variables of ϕ).
• The Weakening rule allows us to weaken/strengthen the pre-/postcondition. Some of the proof rules are similar to the Hoare calculus, but they are not directly driven by the program's syntax. In many cases, it is therefore reasonable to proceed similar to Hoare calculus proofs and therefore we have to make use of our back-annotation to regard the original program.
As already mentioned, the rules are implemented in a F# library called AIFProver so that the rules can be used both in interactive F# sessions or in terms of F# programs or scripts. Thus, from a software engineering point of view, we follow similar ideas used in interactive theorem provers where proof rules and tactics are implemented as ML functions. It is very nice to store proofs in terms of F# scripts that are readable and reproducible certifications of the considered system.
IV. PRELIMINARY CASE STUDIES
To validate our approach, we considered the verification of some classic sequential algorithms like computing Fibonacci numbers, the extended Euclidean algorithm, and sorting algorithms like Bubblesort. The structure of these proofs are analogous to classic proofs using the Hoare calculus and are found in many textbooks. It was however satisfactory to see that we can reproduce these results also for synchronous systems with our rules.
where χ is the termination condition of the considered loop body or term (G, L) otherwise (notice that in this case χ ∧ move (G, L) = 0 holds).
where
= 0} and We also proved the equivalence of two descriptions of a simple microprocessor. One description is a definition of its instruction set (ScalarBehav.qrz) and the other one was a simple non-pipelined hardware implementation (ScalarHW). Both descriptions are examples from the computer systems lecture at the University of Kaiserslautern 5 . The CPUs process 16 bit instruction words on 8 bit data words. Each CPU has eight registers. The interface consists of a program counter pc and a memory access interface with address variable adrMem, data channel dataMem, flags for reading (readMem), writing (writeMem) from/to the memory and flags (reqMem, ackMem, and doneMem) to implement the memory protocol. The module CompareCPUs in Figure 7 was defined to check the equivalence. It defines local variables for the CPUs' interfaces, executes both CPUs in parallel and compares the evaluation of the same instr in a 5 See the example section on http://www.averest.org/examples/ Architecture/MiniMIPS/cpus third parallel thread. This thread demands that all contained assertions are satisfied in each macro step and therefore defines the equivalence of the processor descriptions.
One important step for the verification we identified was that the execution of the Quartz system has similarities to a global loop, even though the outermost statement is a parallel composition. The parallel composition of two loops with the same length and execution behavior cannot be distinguished from a single loop at the level of guarded actions. Hence, the proof required an invariant for this implicit loop. The invariant itself is not very difficult and has many similarities with the safety condition already included in the module CompareCPUs.
The proof of the equivalence was very simple, no modelchecker was required to this end. Instead, only simple term rewriting was sufficient. The proof roughly made use of the invariant rule and made then case distinctions on all available machine instructions. Even though more than 40 sb : ScalarBehav ( instr , pc1 , adrMem1 , dataMem1 , → readMem1 , writeMem1 , reqMem1 , ackMem1 , → doneMem1 , Reg1 ) ; | | sh : ScalarHW ( instr , pc2 , adrMem2 , dataMem2 , → readMem2 , writeMem2 , reqMem2 , ackMem2 , → doneMem2 , Reg2 ) ; Figure 7 . Module CompareCPUs subgoals were obtained, all of them were much smaller than the original goal since one can focus on the execution of a particular instruction. For the behavioral implementation (ScalarBehav) these subgoals usually only contain the actions for three assignments, as given in Figure 8 for the unsigned multiplication. The remaining subgoals are solved by term rewriting alone. Only for the memory access that involves a protocol, we had to make several case distinctions on the variables ackMem and doneMem combined with the application of the Invariant and Sequence rules.
During the verification process, we identified several errors in the implementation. First of all, signed and unsigned arithmetic operations were swapped. Then, we identified that the instructions BNZ and BEZ used a wrong register for the comparison. After removing the bugs, the verification process was easily done and could be also used to verify the same processors with other word sizes.
V. RELATED WORK
The use of guarded actions in general, and even of synchronous guarded actions in particular, are not new, neither for theorem proving nor for interactive verification or even system descriptions: Guarded actions are the basis of many system description languages like Unity [10] , BlueSpec [5] and CAOS [24] , but also of model checkers like Murphi [13] . They have been suggested by Dijkstra in [12] as a formalism to reason about programs. In this paper, we propose the use of synchronous guarded actions as a basis for interactive verification of synchronous programs. Also, it is not difficult to translate other languages like Alur and Henzingers' reactive modules [2] to guarded actions.
Concerning hardware verification, Staunstrup and Greenstreet already proposed the use of their 'Synchronized Transitions' [39, 42] in 1988 as a basis for efficient verification of hardware designs. Using LP, a rewriting-based theorem prover for the Larch language [15] , they were able to verify some non-trivial hardware designs in a series of papers [29, 39, 40, 41, 43] . In contrast to our synchronous guarded actions, Staunstrup and Greenstreets' synchronized transitions are asynchronous in the sense that only a subset of the enabled actions is selected for execution. In addition to the different model of computation, they used the guarded actions primarily as system descriptions which we think is unreadable for large systems. Thus, we consider guarded actions as an intermediate representation obtained by compilation from a better readable synchronous program.
One can easily see that our rules are somehow inspired by rules of the Hoare calculus: We eliminate the control flow by introduction of assumptions and assertions to achieve local provability of verification conditions. In particular, any Hoare triple {Φ} S {Ψ} asserting that postcondition Ψ holds after termination of statement S if precondition Φ holds at starting time of S, can be expressed by adding the guarded actions enter (S) ⇒ assume(Φ) and term (S) ⇒ assert(Ψ) to the set of guarded actions compiled of the statement S. The Hoare calculus rules can then be easily implemented by the rules we have given.
Darringer [11] proposed already in 1979 the use of program verification techniques for the verification of hardware designs. In particular, he focused on Floyd's inductive assertions [14] and symbolic simulation. [46] presents an algorithm to translate transistor-level circuits to programs to apply Hoare-style verification to the verification of switching circuits. This work is also based on Dijkstra's guarded actions [12] and Chandy and Misra's UNITY logic [10] .
To the best of our knowledge, all extensions of Hoare calculi to deal with concurrent programs either consider interleaved programs or rendezvous-style communication according to CSP [23] . Due to the different models of computation, both approaches cannot be used for the verification of synchronous hardware designs. In a recent publication [16] , we described the difficulties for establishing a Hoare calculus for synchronous languages. In [16] , we proposed a program transformation so that all assignments scheduled in a macro step are written in a single synchronous tuple assignment (STA) which transforms the synchronous program essentially to a sequential one (except for the concurrency in the STA). The work presented here is more general and does not need this transformation.
In contrast to the Hoare calculus that is fully driven by the syntax of the program, our rules do not necessarily need to follow the program's syntax. Instead, we may focus on different decompositions. For example, it is also possible to make use of program slicing [3, 44, 45] by removing all guarded actions that write to variables that are not relevant for the proof. Other decomposition strategies may enumerate possible data values as suggested by McMillan e.g. in [28] . Similar as we do, he focused on a combination of modelchecking and theorem proving, but he had a stronger focus on model-checking. In contrast, we see model-checkers just as one of several other proof procedures that can be used to implement our proof rules. McMillan also considered refinement relations that relate events in abstract and refined models, circular compositional proof rules and in particular rules for temporal case splitting as well as data type reduction and symmetry reduction. We do not claim that we found the final set of rules, but work with the current set and incrementally add new rules by need.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose the use of synchronous guarded actions as a basis for the implementation of interactive theorem provers for the verification of synchronous programs. To this end, we use the original program to select suitable proof rules, but apply these rules at the level of synchronous guarded actions that were obtained by compiling the program. Our verification system is interactive, and does therefore not suffer from state-space explosions. Like the Hoare calculus, it can be extended in many ways, e.g. by abstracting from the size of data structures (like array sizes) as well as abstracting from the data types themselves (by considering polymorphic types).
